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Centenary Celebration for Warren 
McCulloch 
A Thumbnail Sketch 
I had the privilege to know most of the founders of cybernet-
ics, and three in particular I honor as mentors: Norbert Wie-
ner, Ross Ashby, and Warren McCulloch. This year there is 
special reason to celebrate Warren Sturgis McCulloch, for it is 
his centenary year. He was born on the 16th of November 
1898, in Orange, New Jersey. 
Warren was a philosopher and scientist. As a freshman at 
Haverford College he told the Quaker philosopher Rufus 
Jones that all he wanted to know was: "What is a number that 
a man may know it; and a man, that he may know a number?" 
To this the Quaker famously replied: "Friend, thee will be 
busy as long as thee lives." Warren acknowledged in his last 
days that the prophecy had been fulfilled, and had helped him 
to invent cybernetics on the way. 
Warren was a physician and psychiatrist. He graduated from 
Yale in 1920, and took in a period of service in the Naval Re-
serve. Then he went to Columbia University where he quali-
fied as a physician, attaining his M.D. in 1927, and became 
known for work on experimental epilepsy. You might well ask 
what he was up to in the early 30s, then, doing graduate work 
in New York University on mathematical physics. But in a 
year or two he was back at the alma mater in Yale and work-
ing on the central nervous system. Throughout the 1940s, he 
was professor of psychiatry and clinical professor of physiol-
ogy at the University of Illinois. 
Warren was a logician and neurophysiologist. He can prop-
erly be called responsible for the field now widely known as 
neural nets (where for some years he had Walter Pitts as a 
significant collaborator). Perhaps it now appears more plausi-
ble why a psychiatrist in Illinois, should suddenly turn up in 
1952 in Cambridge Massachusetts -- running a research labo-
ratory in electronics at MIT! He remained in that small but 
influential room until his death 17 years later, in 1969. In 
1963 he became consultant to the presidential office of Presi-
dent Kennedy. 
Warren was a blacksmith and poet. He enjoyed physical ac-
tivity and working as an artisan. He undertook crazy schemes 
-- from constructing a sizable dam (referred to as a “pond”), 
to building a quasi-cathedral (referred to as a “barn”), on his 
estate at Old Lyme, Connecticut, where Einstein was a 
neighbor. And when the Chicago Literary Society invited him 
to speak, I am not sure that everyone was entirely prepared for 
him to spend the entire evening reciting his own poetry. 
Philosopher and scientist, physician and psychiatrist, logician 
and neurophysiologist, blacksmith and poet -- those are a few 
of the categories that Warren in fact transcended. That is be-
cause he was above all a polymath: an all-purpose intellect, 
and a liver-of-life on a grand (some would say profligate) 
scale.  
In the Small Conference Mode 
The notion of meeting in conference as a small group of pow-
erful intellects -- with no outside audience -- had a vogue dur-
ing the '40s and '50s to which I fervently wish we might re-
turn. It was outstandingly successful; but it does however re-
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quire substantial funding. The theoretical basis of such an 
“evolutionary cluster” came from Margaret Mead, and a per-
sistent advocate was Frank Fremont-Smith. Warren 
McCulloch was a forceful if often manipulative chairman. 
The outstanding series of these conferences was sponsored by 
the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. Each lasted for two full 
days. They began in 1946, and continued on an annual basis 
for ten years. Unfortunately, formal publication did not begin 
until the sixth year: they were a tremendous boost to those of 
us who received them as they arrived. 
Towards the beginning of this series, in 1948, a cognate con-
ference was held at the New York Academy of Sciences under 
the heading of teleological mechanisms -- again with Warren 
presiding. It was a favorite topic of his. Teleology comes from 
the Greek root meaning end in the sense of purpose. It is con-
cerned with the science that asks how things come to be as 
they are -- how regulated, shall we say. Or shall we not say 
this, on the grounds that we might be incriminated by any of a 
hundred canons of philosophy. The term sounds like an oxy-
moron, after all, as did Wiener's original definition of cyber-
netics as being concerned with the animal and the machine -- 
all-in-one-breath as it were. To this day, confusion about the 
intentions of the founders of cybernetics is widespread, on the 
part of people who do not refer to original sources. Here is 
Fremont-Smith introducing the conference of 1948: 
"The concept of teleological mechanisms... may be viewed as 
an attempt to escape from... older, mechanistic formulations 
that now appear inadequate, and to provide new and more fruit-
ful conceptions and more effective methodologies for studying 
self-regulating processes, self-orienting systems and organ-
isms, and self-directing personalities..." 
So for those who are prone to reinventing wheels in different 
sizes, please ruminate over those different sentences -- and the 
fact that they were written just fifty years ago. 
In the Mode of Scientific and Papers 
A major collection of seminal papers may be found in War-
ren's book Embodiments of Mind, and there is a complete set 
of his works available in four volumes. Here, however, we 
must remain within the scope of the thumbnail sketch. 
The first major work that he wrote in the field of cybernetics 
was surely: 
1943: A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in 
Nervous Activity 
Observing that activities in the nervous system are made up of 
discrete events, it was proposed that the relations between 
them could be treated through propositional logic. Using a 
rather outdated symbolism devised by Carnap, and the un-
gainly notation of Russell, Warren succeeded in showing that 
nervous nets could be rigorously represented in mathematical 
logic. The regenerative activity of constituent circuits so de-
scribed, however, leaves the brain with no concept of either 
space or time. This means that fact, sensations and ideas must 
be generated within networks, and are not determined by 
them. Walter Pitts was the co-author of this paper, and Warren 
was generous in referring to his improvement of the mathe-
matics. 
This brief comment gives the clue to the philosophical impor-
tance of these ideas. The extent to which the organization of 
the brain determines its mental outcomes is not clear to most 
people even today. The rigorous logic of the Logical Calculus 
began for the first time to elucidate the difference between 
brain structures and mental contents. The development of this 
model also made it clear that there must be inhibitors in nerv-
ous nets as well as excitors -- a fact not yet conceded in neu-
rophysiology at that time, although later taken for granted. 
Many arguments with orthodox psychology were generated 
by these results, and even more so in psychiatry. Warren was a 
vigorous opponent of the psycho-analytical schools. Indeed, 
we had several major disagreements about the importance of 
Freud himself. 
1958: Agathe Tyche of Nervous Nets -- the Lucky 
Reckoners 
Still pursuing the topic of nervous nets, I refer to another for-
mal paper, this time dealing with reliability. The substance of 
which the brain is made is notoriously unreliable: neurons are 
extinguished without warning, synapses change their thresh-
olds capriciously, and a single shot of alcohol changes the 
whole cerebral ecology. And yet we humans continued to op-
erate fairly smoothly through it all. The success of this is due 
to redundancy -- of a sophisticated kind. I mean that it is not 
simply a matter of replicating fallible components, until some 
of them fortuitously work, but of generating complicated logi-
cal structures within them. I have written extensively about 
the redundancy of potential command, for example, which 
involves just such a strategy. In the present paper, we are pre-
sented with an early example of the formal treatment whereby 
unreliable components achieve reliable outcomes. 
But this time I want to use this example to talk about Warren 
the man. I had the good fortune to be present on the occasion 
when he gave his original paper on the Lucky Reckoners in 
1958. The chairman announced that as usual the paper would 
be taken as read. Silence fell as Warren arose, clutching a set 
of manuscript pages. He surveyed the audience with a rather 
intimidating mien, looking up and down the packed rows. 
"Who has actually read the paper?" -- the tone of voice sug-
gested that he might well decide to cross-question anyone 
with the temerity to reply. Half a dozen hands were raised. At ￿’’4
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that Warren tossed the whole sheaf of papers high in the air. 
The pages fluttered down among the front rows. 
It was true that without detailed prior study the difficult argu-
ments and complicated diagrams of the paper would have 
been virtually incomprehensible, and surely the author was 
correct to abandon the enterprise. However, I have never seen 
this happen before or since -- whereas hardly a conference 
passes without listening to some luckless speaker with a simi-
lar problem mumbling through incoherently to the end of his 
allotted span. It was so typical of Warren to be thus direct; but 
of course it was also typical of Warren to deliver an im-
promptu speech on some other subject that interested him at 
the time -- and acquit himself with brilliance. 
1959: What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain 
There is no time to discuss this elaborate research, which elu-
cidated among other things that there are four distinct parallel 
distribution channels whereby the frog's eye informs his brain 
about the visual image. Even so, I have picked on this third 
example for a good reason. 
In many ways this work adumbrated an era in which systems 
thinking would become incorporated into an earlier biology of 
the old school. A significant early founder of this develop-
ment was Sommerhoff, who published Analytical Biology in 
the year 1950. It is sufficient, perhaps, to invoke the great cy-
bernetic Ross Ashby, who told me that the whole develop-
ment of his own work in Design for a Brain derived initially 
from there. The Frog's Eye, in turn, became recognized as a 
milestone. 
The authors were, in the order cited, Jerry Lettvin, Humberto 
Maturana, Warren McCulloch, and Walter Pitts. Notice first 
that the order is alphabetical. Not every eminent person ex-
tends that courtesy. Notice second the name of Maturana, who 
was at the time a graduate student of McCulloch's; he has 
since become a world leader in the field of cognition -- and 
also the originator of autopoiesis. 
Some personal memorabilia 
When I think of Warren, I think first of my mentor. We met 
each other first in the mid-'50s, and adopted that relationship 
from the start. We had no formal connection in academia or in 
any other milieu -- we were simply friends, but he was thirty 
years older than I. We had something profound in common; 
we could joke and argue and hassle as friends do; but under-
neath he must have been aware of something akin to venera-
tion. We stayed at each other's houses and each other's labs. 
Especially I relished staying at the estate in Old Lyme Con-
necticut. 
Next I think of his incredible output of writings, which I stud-
ied so assiduously, and I became addicted to his whimsical 
titles. Their style is impossible to resist (at least I have found 
their imitation irresistible, to the annoyance of some more 
bibliographically prudent). Two papers published when I first 
knew him were listed adjacently in the bibliography: Myste-
rium Iniquitatis of Sinful Man Aspiring into the Place of God 
followed immediately by Central Effects of Strychnine on 
Spinal Afferent Fibers -- this gives some feeling for the effect.  
Seized with many of his sayings, I can offer only a few at 
random -- the first having effected an observable change: 
·  get your elbows away from your sides, you bloody Eng-
lishman 
·  we must learn to fight fair in our shirt sleeves 
·  don't bite my finger, look where it's pointing 
·  all impersonal questions arise from personal reasons and 
are best understood from their histories 
Finally, I frequently have occasion to remember the story that 
dates from 1959 when Warren was talking to a conference in 
France about the mathematics of neurology. The discussion 
was halted by an “antique president”, who thanked him for his 
obscurity. Added Warren, “The next time they hear it they will 
say, ‘It is not news,’ and the third time, ‘it is obvious’." I my-
self was last formally thanked for my obscurity as recently as 
two years ago, though the location had changed to South Af-
rica. I trust that the rest of the story will follow to Pretoria in 
due course. In the meantime, no one should ever be disturbed 
by this kind of reception -- it is a necessary precursor to any 
change of paradigm. 
For the moment this thumbnail sketch ends my celebration for 
Warren McCulloch on his 100th birthday. He was a man with 
scant respect for pedigree or academic honors. His personal 
accolade -- not lightly bestowed -- was to say of someone that 
s/he was “brighter 'n hell.” He had magnanimity -- but did not 
suffer fools gladly. I shall present a last and precious word 
from Warren when I close.  
Views from the Bridge 
I began by celebrating a man who is a hundred years old, and 
shall end by celebrating a woman who is still vibrantly alive. 
Let me take leave to make a bridge between these two ex-
tremes, through a number of reflections about my own experi-
ences of cybernetics.  
It seemed to me from the start that our field was very weak in 
an understanding of epistemology. This I fear is true of the 
whole of science but cybernetics has less excuse than other 
disciplines -- since, according to Wiener's original definition, 
it deals with regulation in the animal and the machine. This 
refers us directly to the interaction between brains on the one 
hand and other kinds of system on the other. What do we ￿4#+5’ ￿#/175 ￿’0 n ￿1/’0
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know about systems, and how do we know it? This identifies 
the cybernetic domain -- and offers a handy definition of epis-
temology too. I have already said a good deal, through 
McCulloch's work, about the nature of brain. But how specifi-
cally is the bridge to be built between that kind of knowledge 
and everything else? 
About understanding models 
The first bridge on which we need to reflect concerns the na-
ture of models. Models are mental constructs of what we 
rather uncritically call “reality”. The term reality makes intel-
lectuals uneasy, however, and we often waggle a pair of 
crooked fingers impotently in mid- air to designate quotation 
marks -- thereby demonstrating unease if nothing else. When 
it comes to physical models though, we feel happier. We talk 
about scale models of buildings for instance, or mathematical 
models of the stresses that buildings display. And these two 
kinds of model are surely constructs of actual buildings. The 
truth is, however, that anything at all that comes to our atten-
tion is a construct -- and so a model in this sense. Starting 
from sense data themselves, which are constrained by the 
physiological apparatus of ears, eyes and so on, our models of 
reality are only as good as this equipment. (This is a direct 
consequence of the Conant-Ashby theorem.) Models are not 
to be confused with the reality of which they are the models -- 
if indeed there is such a further reality, which is open to ques-
tion. 
If something is illuminated by ultraviolet light, we shall not 
see it. If a sound occurs at 25,000 cycles, we shall not hear it. 
These basic limitations of sensation are by definition defec-
tive, so any models based upon them will be defective in the 
same degree. More elaborate constructs are doubly so. Sup-
pose we consider an angel, and define it as a being of higher 
complexity than ourselves. Then of course we shall not be 
able to recognize it. So ontology is the slave and victim of 
epistemology; and our highest achievements are no more than 
inferences. This makes even the best of scientific judgments 
less than secure; it makes the best of artistic masterpieces sub-
lime. 
A second and inevitable defect of models has its roots in in-
adequate variety. If we cannot distinguish all the possible 
states of any supposed reality, we are restricted to model-
making using the constructs that we can distinguish. Then all 
images are restricted to the visible spectrum, and all music is 
restricted to the spectrum of audible sound. Ratiocination it-
self is restricted by the neurophysiology of the brain. As to 
angels as defined, they cannot be recognized in just the same 
way as you must inevitably fail to tie a knot in a four dimen-
sional piece of string. 
Because any subject of our attention is limited in these ways, 
and because individuals differ in acuity of perception and in 
pattern penetration, any system is a subjective phenomenon. 
We cannot have an objective system -- which means that no 
system is ever right or wrong. A system is a model that is 
more or less useful for some purpose. If that purpose is not 
defined, then there is no criterion of utility. 
It is time perhaps to lighten the atmosphere of these weighty 
considerations by choosing a more jocular example of the 
range of variety as a restraint on model-making. Suppose that 
you want to understand the nature of music. Unfortunately, 
because of low variety in your repertoire the only basis for 
model-making available is an experience of Wagner's Parsifal 
and another of a rock-and-roll concert. Can you construct a 
useful model of music on that basis? If so, what would it look 
like? Let us first ask what these two experiences share. Three 
things, perhaps: they are both too long, both too loud, and you 
cannot understand the words of either. If these things were all 
that mattered, and you yourself had made the judgments, it is 
easy to see that you might have created a valid because it is a 
useful model. The models we use can be as arbitrary as that -- 
and I did say that all models are subjective! 
About not understanding jokes 
That example made its point legitimately -- but it turned out to 
be funny. That is because of the context in which it was put 
forward, and because the variety admitted to the system of 
music was absurdly low. Here are a few selected examples 
that are not in the least funny, because the context is different. 
As to the variety, a strange embedment will be discerned... 
·  For every dollar of aid vouchsafed to the poor world by 
the rich, eleven dollars is exacted from them in interest. 
·  Forty thousand children in the poor world die every day 
from easily alleviated illnesses, notably those of malnutri-
tion and contaminated water, while 600,000 women die as 
a result of complications arising from pregnancy and 
childbirth. 
·  In poor countries one in ten pregnant women in do not 
survive -- it is one in five thousand in Britain. 
·  Year after year the model of Canadian society is held up 
as a cynosure by the United Nations as the best in the 
world. The Prime Minister continually refers to this with 
pride -- but 21 percent of Canadian children live in pov-
erty. 
·  In Britain, much exercised as it is by the abuse of animal 
rights, the percentage is much higher -- more like a third 
of children live in poverty there. 
·  Indeed, on the United Nations poverty index Britain ranks 
almost the worst among the world’s industrial nations. 
But the top slice of the wealthy grows significantly richer 
every year. 
I stumbled on these examples by happenstance, and I hope 
that you find them outrageous. They do not happen because 
they are willed by vicious policies. They happen because the ￿’’4
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models that uphold them do not have requisite variety to dis-
criminate between the policies that generate such results. 
When a large system is recursively embedded in a smaller 
system, the large system often includes entailments that con-
strain discrimination of variety at the lower level. We saw this 
happening in each of those examples. In general, the model of 
Western capitalism includes entailments of the model at lower 
levels of recursivity that are not in practice susceptible to dis-
pute -- because to call them in question would deny the para-
digm obtaining at a higher level. Here is an example: the 
dogma of privatization is an instance of a policy that belongs 
to the paradigm. It is also a policy that generally fails. In-
stances abound, here are a couple from Britain: 
·  The private ownership of water was a disaster of scandal-
ous proportions. Management emoluments skyrocketed, 
while water quality went down -- in some cases even the 
provision of piped water failed, and supplies were trans-
ported by truck. 
·  Following the privatization of the national railway sys-
tem, complaints showed an increase of 103 per cent -- 
topping a million last year. 
·  Timetables and fares were in disarray, thanks to the carv-
ing up of franchises, and the unwillingness of newly 
competitive entities to talk to each other. The Consumers' 
Consultative Committee referred to appalling delays and 
cancellations. 
But although this policy of privatization in the public domain 
is a manifest failure, there is no requisite variety within ac-
cepted politico-economic theory to argue the point. It is an 
intrinsic component of the macro-model and must therefore 
be pre-judged a success. It would take a new paradigm within 
which either to assert or deny any of the statements relating to 
actual events such as the examples mentioned. In the mean-
time, would-be rebuttals constitute undecidable (Godelian) 
sentences. This is not to say that the previous system did not 
require overhauling. It is to say that privatization expressed as 
the raw exploitation of greed within the robber-baronies is not 
the best way to do it. 
I said at the start of this section that science is weak in epis-
temology. The great Isaac Newton famously alleged Hypothe-
ses non fingo -- I do not form hypotheses. He simply did not 
recognize that he did so. Yet his dictum has certainly sur-
vived, and latter day scientists continue not to recognize the 
point. Science is supposed to amass "the facts", and then to 
form hypotheses based on those facts. But the hypothesis is 
already covertly implicit in the selection of the facts, and fur-
ther selection of a less than overt nature occurs during the 
process of elaborating the hypothesis further. The continuing 
operation is circular. That is why cybernetics takes ouroboros, 
the snake that bites its own tail as a suitable logo, and talks 
about circular causality. 
It is from within the circular model of Western capitalism that 
monstrous results are generated at lower recursive levels of 
variety that are inevitably undecidable. Attention to this kind 
of absurdity is often dissipated by changes of terminology so 
that contradictions are accommodated. Witness for example 
the more than twenty changes made by the British govern-
ment to the definition of unemployment during the '70s and 
later -- until the definition matched its paradigmatic expecta-
tions. A more fundamental circularity concerns a truly tena-
ciously held belief, which means that contradictory evidence 
will be attributed to quite different causes. Witness the 
contention that market forces in free competition can be 
expected successfully to regulate an economy. This policy is 
inherently unstable, and can cybernetically be guaranteed not 
to work. But if we are assured by authority that it does work, 
instability will be put down to other factors. Because of the 
underlying instability, there will be many contenders. 
The hardening of the categories 
Various taxonomies have been used to classify human knowl-
edge, the most general based upon the practical needs of li-
braries (-- or possibly librarians). The library is organized by 
subjects. As new knowledge accrued, it was allocated to the 
“correct” subject in the shelves. The past tense is important: 
those judgments were written in stone, although later knowl-
edge makes the categories less than optimal. So here is an-
other illustration of circular causality: a book is allocated to a 
subject, which is defined as a university department, which 
determines what books will be allocated. The growth of 
knowledge so defined is an accretion of past decisions about 
the categories to which books belong. This raises problems 
when hitherto separate topics become multidisciplinary: bio-
physics, for example, or socio-economics. These problems are 
not always satisfactorily solved. In the case of a new subject 
that is multidisciplinary, such as cybernetics, no satisfactory 
solution is found. 
Research papers feed and exacerbate the system. Under a uni-
versity regime in which the number of publications is the only 
criterion of success, and more important to advancement than 
quality, or careful teaching, or the nurture of human potential, 
a predictable system develops. It involves the circular causal-
ity of publication, fresh submission, journal editor, anony-
mous referees (but guess who), reinforcement of the topic and 
of its kind of handling, and publication. The character of the 
journal consolidates. Before long, everyone knows the peck-
ing order of journal prestige. If you are getting used to circu-
lar causality by now, you will instantly recognize who will 
review a new book, and why it is that an innovative book will 
not be reviewed in a journal whose reader would gain most 
from it. By the same token, a new author is lucky to publish 
an innovative book in the first place. ￿4#+5’ ￿#/175 ￿’0 n ￿1/’0
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If the learned taxonomies we use have had the dire conse-
quences so briefly indicated, it behooves us to ask whether 
there could be an alternative approach. It would be idle to 
imagine for an instant that the whole rationale of knowledge 
as now organized could be supplanted. But I am arguing for 
something more subtle -- an augmentation of the existing 
practice by taking account of whatsoever insights we may 
draw from the theory of models. It would seem (judging from 
the jocular example) that any system would serve as a model 
of any other system, if precise conditions as to purpose were 
specified. Suppose that we look at a managerial situation that 
is reminiscent of a system already understood in scientific 
terms. That might then suggest that a useful purpose might be 
served by pursuing such a metaphor -- the hot flow of metal 
through a steel works, say, as referred to the blood coursing 
through the body.  
This metaphor was actually deployed in a steel works in Shef-
field 50 years ago. The common ground of energy -- ex-
pressed in one model as latent heat, and in the other as dor-
mant cash flow -- led to some interesting ideas. Think of the 
distinction between arteries and veins for example. But those 
ideas reposed on insight, on the metaphor, even though they 
were elaborated by further similarities. The air soon became 
dense with similes. I recall a manager who said at some point 
that he felt like a piano that was playing in the wrong key. It 
seems likely that by now the word analogy has come to your 
mind. And if it has, the threat of false analogy will not be far 
behind. Then comes the well-known phrase: "you have 
pushed the analogy too far.” Yet the approach through model-
building was opening exciting possibilities, and in particular 
liberating creative alternatives in both policy and practice. 
Could a more rigorous treatment of models embracing models 
be devised? 
 
Science is supposed to amass “the facts”, and then to 
form hypotheses based on those facts.  
But the hypothesis is already covertly implicit  
in the selection of the facts,  
and further selection of a less than overt nature 
occurs during the process of elaborating the 
hypothesis further. 
 
 
 
Attention to this kind of absurdity is often 
dissipated by changes of terminology so that 
contradictions are accommodated. ￿’’4
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I re-read the earlier work of Victorian logicians such as John 
Stuart Mill, who had made noble efforts to import rigor into 
analogy, but they seemed to be not rigorous enough. The an-
swer I eventually proposed came in 1965, with an epistemol-
ogy based on the theory of groups. The mathematical treat-
ment was published in the journal Nature (Beer, 1965), and 
was transposed as usual into a diagram (published in Decision 
and Control (Beer, 1966)). This later passed into the general 
literature as the Yo-yo Model. (See Figure 1 The Yo-yo 
Model: an epistemological approach.) 
Here we see an insight or a metaphor connecting some fairly 
well understood scientific situation to a managerial situation 
less well understood. The two situations are each reduced to 
conceptual models, providing a carefully argued comparison 
of the kind Mill had in mind, and taking care to stop short of 
false analogy. The two conceptual models are then reduced to 
a rigorous formulation, involving homomorphic transforms -- 
a many-one reduction to one-one that sacrifices variety in the 
cause of rigor, please note. The original two models are now 
isomorphic with each other, and can therefore be generalized 
into a scientific model. This must by now be expressed in a 
lingua franca, probably mathematics. At this stage, we may 
ask whether the scientific model, developed from this particu-
lar pair of perceptions, represents a generally applicable sys-
temic behavior. That is where the yo-yo comes in. On the cen-
tral line of the diagram, extra samples of the class being con-
sidered are tested for validity and utility. We might look in the 
original case, for instance for other flow systems that store 
kinetic energy. Always assuming that the model formulations ￿4#+5’ ￿#/175 ￿’0 n ￿1/’0
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are rigorously maintained in each throw of the yo-yo, value in 
the model will grow. 
Let us call this systemic invariance. Scientific progress has 
always depended upon recognizing the invariant properties of 
systems. They used to be called laws of nature, but to use 
such a useful term nowadays would be a postmodernist sole-
cism. The yo-yo model builds an inductive case of mounting 
confirmations of the model concerned in action. As it does so, 
it will gradually trim irrelevancies and find the essence of the 
invariance. For example, we have encountered the systemic 
invariance of gravitation so often that that we now take it for 
granted -- these irrelevancies have disappeared. If I drop my 
glass on the floor we all except that it will shatter. No one will 
warn me that my name is not Newton and the glass is not an 
apple. Systemic invariance works in gravitation within a de-
fined purpose -- give or take the perihelion of Mercury for 
instance. Remember "models are neither true nor false only 
useful for a purpose." We are not purposing planetary travel 
on this particular afternoon. 
On the potency of invariance 
Systemic invariance is widespread in cybernetics, and a most 
potent tool. The topic ought to be central to any course in cy-
bernetics -- but it seems not to figure in that cohesive way. 
Instead of a course on systemic invariance, teachers seem to 
be content with pointing out mere instances of an idea that 
proved to be relevant to some case history. 
Historically, the systemic invariance first noted by the foun-
ders of cybernetics was the ubiquity of feedback mecha-
nisms -- in particular the role of error controlled negative 
feedback. That kind of terminology has led many people to 
the conclusion that cybernetics is fundamentally deterministic 
in character, just as if we knew nothing about stochastic proc-
esses, fuzzy logic, or any other way of handling outcomes that 
are not determinate. In particular, many have been led to ig-
nore this feature in societary systems, far from “mechanistic” 
though they be. An instance: high-gain error-controlled nega-
tive feedback systems rapidly become dominated by the error 
signal. (See Brain of the Firm (Beer, 1972 and new edition 
1981) pages 34-37.) Evidently the model used derives from 
servo-mechanics. But the methodology of the yo-yo has been 
used in multiple applications to generalize it. The relevance of 
this high-gain error signal to the domination of societary 
agenda by the media is then inescapable. The model that 
demonstrates this, together with many other features of so-
cietary invariance, is to be found in the paper The Will of the 
People (Beer, 1983a). 
High on the importance scale of systemic invariance comes 
homeostasis. The origin of this term goes back to 1927 and 
Walter Cannon's Wisdom of the Body -- although as long ago 
as 1865 Claude Bernard wrote about the "constance du milieu 
interieur." Both authors have always been recognized as a 
precursor of cybernetics. To this should be added Sommer-
hoff's 1950 book Analytical Biology, which I mentioned ear-
lier. But Ashby himself was the man who most importantly 
formalized homeostatic theory, and recognized the self-
vetoing homeostatic. Out of his work, which included a fa-
mous experimental machine, grew his understanding of the 
Law of Requisite Variety. In my opinion, this law has the 
same stature in the world of affairs as the law of gravity has in 
the world of physics. It is not recognized as such, because 
people do not apply the yo-yo methodology. As soon as any-
one tests Requisite Variety in any real system at all, s/he per-
ceives its relevance -- and is also likely to discover something 
important. 
Let us pause for a moment here to remark on the current fash-
ion to misrepresent Ashby. It has been suggested that because 
he discovered how to measure variety, he thought it was an 
absolute measure. He knew perfectly well -- none better in 
fact -- that any nominated system depends upon its definition, 
so the variety measured must depend on the arbitrary selection 
of factors included in it. Do those people imagine that because 
it is possible to divide folk into male and female, that Ashby 
would thereupon declare “objectively” that humanity has only 
two states? Again, have people who say that he did not under-
stand that the observer is part of the observed system failed 
altogether to understand his notion of the self-vetoing homeo-
stat? Before he wrote about that, I was myself using the cog-
nate term "implicit control". That was because each of us 
knew from Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy that the 
intrinsic and ultimately decisive role in any observation is that 
of the observer. 
The universal validity of the examples I have just been using 
of systemic invariance is well encapsulated by the food web 
and its intricacies. Consider the cabbage aphis. That is the tiny 
bug that feeds on cabbage leaves. It weighs very little indeed. 
The New York Academy of Sciences many years ago quoted 
some research that calculated what weight of aphides would 
accrue in one season if this single aphis (s/he is hermaphro-
ditic) was supplied with unlimited quantities of cabbage -- and 
no predators assaulted either population. The answer was 822 
million tons, about five times the human population. We do 
not expect that to happen, and know in principle why. The 
principle is properly called the self-vetoing homeostat, and it 
operates through complex systemic interaction according to 
the law of requisite variety. ￿’’4
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Yo-yo-ing through the world of affairs, and reflecting on simi-
lar problems to do with the environment, we rapidly find out 
what to do about many problems (but no one will believe it). 
And we may reflect on how managers would typically deal 
with the explosion of aphides. Overwhelmed by variety, they 
would first divide the country into hundreds of amenable 
zones, and appoint zone commanders with supporting staff, 
consultative committees, and so on. That's the appropriate 
way to deal with high variety. Research would be started at 
great expense to examine the feasibility of contraception 
among hermaphrodites -- hm... better double the research 
grants. That's the appropriate way to deal with intractable 
technological problems. The legal department would have its 
own feasibility study to look at the licensing situation... There 
are bound to be appalling pitfalls, but fortunately there are 
enough lawyers to go round to study each of them. Mean-
while, inadequate insight is likely to render the aphis extinct. I 
shall not go on with this analysis, although it is fun, because 
that situation cannot actually arise. In any case, nature already 
knows the answer. The serious point, however, is that manag-
ers and ministers behave all the time as if that is exactly what 
they would do. They do not understand cybernetics; they uni-
laterally attempt to repeal the law of requisite variety without 
knowing that it exists; they act in accord with the received 
managerial paradigm. 
The next critical idea that I mention links with homeostasis, 
and it is closure. Much of systemic invariance features clo-
sure, and we have already seen that circularity -- which is a 
form of closure -- is a cybernetic phenomenon. When I first 
studied philosophy, circularity was anathema: it was the name 
of a logical fallacy, or it was a kind of argumentation that got 
nowhere. Through cybernetics, however, came the realization 
that circularity properly understood is a critically valuable 
building block of system. This perception is not limited to 
cybernetics. The latest candidate as the basic and smallest ￿4#+5’ ￿#/175 ￿’0 n ￿1/’0
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building block of all matter is not the atom, not the electron, 
not the quark. It is the eleven-dimensional superstring, con-
ceived as a vibrating loop. This may be too small an entity to 
contemplate; the perception of closure of which we are intui-
tively aware is our own knowledge of selfhood. This is the 
notion of a defined entity thought of as self-contained, and in 
principle bounded by that containment. On examination, this 
will never proved to be absolute but rather a convenient con-
vention, but convenient it certainly is. (See Figure 2: The 
Sunburst Model of Selfhood: an enneagram with discriminate 
varieties.) 
The Sunburst model began by describing the selfhood of a 
human being. The blob in the center of the diagram stands for 
the autonomous nervous system. The inner circle is the enve-
lope of skin -- within which the radial lines take in the rest of 
the nervous system. The larger complete circle outside the 
inner circle is the rest of the conscious individual. The radial 
lines now do not always reach where they looked as if they 
were going... these are the goals of life, the strategies of at-
tainment. The final circle, which is incomplete, is (what Aris-
totle called) entelechy, which nowadays might be spoken of as 
human potential. The model is set in an enneagram -- the 
nine-pointed star that has held much spiritual significance in 
many cultures from the Sufis down. There is no time to say 
much more about this here, although you should not find it 
difficult to discern resonances of everything so far mentioned 
in this talk. All the radial lines represent discriminate varieties 
as the circle expands: we know the law of requisite variety, 
we know the Conant-Ashby theorem, we know about closure, 
implicit control, and so on. The nine small circles represent 
loops... recall the superstrings. 
The reason for quoting the Sunburst model here is simply to 
emphasize the importance of systemic invariance. As far as 
human selfhood goes, I have used this same model (with dif-
ferent emphasis) to discuss the central nervous system with 
students of neurophysiology on the one hand, and the spiritual 
path with Jesuit seminarians on the other. With philosophers, 
the Sunburst model was extended to examine Leibnizian mo-
nadology. But the notion of selfhood does not end with per-
sonal selfhood. I defined the notion earlier as an entity 
thought of as self-contained, relatively bounded. It has been 
used to talk about Gaia, the planet Earth, and its survival. It 
was used to examine the politics of the nation state in Mexico. 
It was extensively developed in working on the planning sys-
tem of a major city in Ontario. I hope very much that dele-
gates here will accept the challenge to build significant uni-
versity courses based on systemic invariance. I have made 
dozens of models in my life as a consultant, many of which 
could not be published for commercial reasons. Never mind 
them. These have served their purposes well. What matters is 
the search for invariance. 
The viable system model -- VSM 
There are three whole books (Beer 1972 and 1981,1979,1985) 
and many other writings about the VSM, and I cannot begin 
to describe them here. This occasion is devoted to the basis of 
cybernetics and the voyage of discovery it invites. What fol-
lows is something about motivation, something about devel-
opment, one new principle of systemic invariance, and an un-
published application. To make this possible, the complete 
diagram of the VSM is appended -- not so that the newcomer 
could possibly understand much of what is going on, s/he will 
find it virtually incomprehensible. I hope it will remind those 
who already know, but the real purpose is to demonstrate the 
new principle. (See Figure 3: The Viable System Model: to 
illustrate only included recursivity.) 
The model of the brain that I developed throughout the 1950s, 
is a closed system. There is no way of knowing what is owed 
to my three mentors in this respect, since discussion was vola-
tile. However, I believe I was the first to set down a formal 
closed model of the brain: it used a topological algebra de-
rived from Bourbakian set-theory. (Two of those mentors 
were present when the paper (Beer, 1962) was presented in 
1960; and did not demur.)  
This closed model was neurophysiological. I used the yo-yo 
model as far as ever I could, and tested other biological sys-
tems against it. The conclusion was that I could never find 
anything that was inconsistent with what the neurophysiology 
was saying about regulation -- in particular what was newly 
becoming known of ecological systems was supportive. But ￿’’4
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this was a weak outcome in terms of the inductive power of 
the yo-yo. It worried me deeply that other major systems of 
the body's regulatory processes could not successfully be 
mapped, especially the endocrine system. To a holist, it was 
self-evidently reductive to be modeling even so large a system 
as the neural brain in isolation, when there were so many bio-
chemical pointers left un- accounted for. This was surely be-
cause too little was known about the internal interactions of 
the definable components. I knew about neurons and their 
nervous processes. As to the rest -- even at the cytological 
level there were mysteries. To this day, I feel convinced that 
too little is known about the glial cells for instance. 
I spent much time, covering the decade of the '50s and be-
yond, in trying to develop a systemic model of the endocrine 
system. But little progress was made, and I have since found 
out that the questions I was posing were unanswerable at that 
time. I had to be content with the fact that at least new things 
were being discovered: for instance, when I was a student in 
1943 nobody knew that the pituitary gland was innervated -- 
or at least they wouldn't tell me if they did! You do not need 
convincing that this gland is all-important, and withal a large 
structure, so the omission seems incomprehensible. But then 
we recall the hardening of the categories. Why in the '40s 
would endocrinologists be hunting nerves? Well, I was work-
ing with an authoritative book on endocrinology that began, 
"The endocrine balance of most people is probably about 
normal." I have never forgotten this pearl. It was some kind of 
solace. 
In Brain of the Firm (1972) I expounded what I had earned 
from the VSM in terms that the manager might understand. 
First of all, there was closure. And in order to re-open that 
bounded concept, I had drawn on mathematics again. Number 
theory supplied definition by recursion: the bounded system 
could be re-opened by including recursive models of itself 
inside itself. The image of Russian dolls was a help. So the 
diagram of the VSM contained icons of itself. Next, using the 
yo-yo methodology, the VSM was shorn of its neurophysi-
ological connotations. The Heart of Enterprise (1979) re-
created the work to yield a model of any viable system. The 
diagrammatic version was enhanced so that the included re-
cursions were no longer icons, but faithful copies. However, it 
was not until Diagnosing the System for Organizations (1985) 
was written that I finally solved the problem of diagrammatic 
recursion with a degree of elegance. This is what you see in 
figure 3. The model is complete but, as mentioned before, it is 
included without further explanation simply to illustrate the 
new principle of included recursivity, like this. 
By focusing on the two included circles, and turning them 
through 45 degrees, you will see that small-scale but exact 
reproductions of the total model are presented. A very large 
circle to match the very large square in the upper right hand 
corner is omitted as too ungainly to draw, but no internal con-
nections attached to it. Otherwise the topology is exact. 
Moreover, a lower recursion still is implied, just as a higher 
recursion is implied by the large square -- making four levels 
of recursion visible on the diagram, two of them complete. So 
please note this dictum: 
Every viable system contains and is contained in a viable sys-
tem. 
The recursions of the VSM are indefinitely extensible -- there 
were eleven recursions in the VSM of the socioeconomic 
model of Chile developed in 1971 to '73 for President Allende 
(see Brain of the Firm). Much emphasis is placed upon the 
faithful reproduction of the VSM at every recursion, because 
these are mathematical theorems reproduced topologically. 
They are not arbitrary illustrations. The validity of the meth-
odology -- especially its recursive features -- depends on 
them. It follows that attempts to represent the. VSM to make 
it "easier", sadly lead to invalidity. 
Applications of the VSM have been made over the last forty 
years all over the world, and they have ranged from the eu-
karyote cell and a bee colony to the nation state and the globe. 
They have included every conceivable enterprise both public 
and private in between. Sometimes applications have 
amounted to little more than creating pretty pictures and writ-
ing names in the boxes. But so much more can be done, in 
particular via the quantification of variety. The VSM consti-
tutes profoundly interlocking networks of five subsystems, to 
which the balance of variety is central. It hinges on the main-
tenance of homeostasis between the horizontal and vertical 
axes of the model. 
Let me draw on advanced thinking here for the benefit of VSM 
adepts. According to the VSM's First Axiom of Management, 
the sum of horizontal variety disclosed by the operational ele-
ments (System One) must equal the sum of vertical variety dis-
closed on the six vertical components of corporate cohesion. 
The Law of Cohesion itself relates rather similar equalities for 
each pair of multiple recursions. (See The Heart of Enterprise) 
Here now is the promised application. About 15 years ago I 
was commissioned to re-design the Canadian Red Cross, with 
the support of a leading company of management consultants 
who made available staff to carry out investigations on a na-
tional basis from their provincial offices. This involved a very 
extensive study, and incorporated a large number of recom-
mendations, which were adopted -- with one exception. The 
most dramatic of the visible changes made meant moving the 
main office from Toronto to the national capital, Ottawa. Evi-
dently, the study was comprehensive: it was built on the 
VSM, but it took account of sociopolitical factors too -- as is 
essential in the practice of consultancy. However, the one rec-
ommendation that failed was a casualty of that sort. 
Most unusually, the Canadian Red Cross “owned” the national 
blood supply. In most countries blood is treated independently 
of any institution. Here it was one of the many operations ￿4#+5’ ￿#/175 ￿’0 n ￿1/’0
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(System One) of the Red Cross -- alongside all the others, 
ranging from First Aid through to appeals in support of inter-
national emergencies. Now, the organization required to ad-
minister most of these activities is quite different from that 
required to administer blood supply. Everything else is based 
on voluntary effort, with whatever is involved by way of phi-
lanthropy and the committee structure required to organize on 
the part of "the great and the good". The blood supply con-
versely is science-intensive. It also requires administration of 
technology of a high order. You might think that these activi-
ties would make strange bedfellows. But Canada did not think 
that, and the reason was this. Blood is a serious economic 
commodity. In the Red Cross, it accounted for much more 
than half the budget -- on the credit side. To put it bluntly, the 
Red Cross made a great deal of money out of blood. Talking 
to committed Red Cross people, one could see that most 
thought it entirely appropriate that the lucrative activity 
should support the altruistic. The argument is highly debatable 
-- until you consult the variety equations of the VSM, and 
discover it to be a matter of assessing varieties. 
The First Axiom of Management simply does not hold. The 
horizontal variety committed to regulating blood is vastly inc-
ommensurable with the horizontal variety that is based on 
voluntary regulation. Moreover, collecting blood on a decen-
tralized basis (there is no alternative) means that the incom-
mensurability of variety crosses metasystens for every pair of 
recursions in a way that denies the Law of Cohesion itself. In 
the circumstances it was idle to engage in semantics. The cy-
bernetics left me no option but to recommend the complete 
withdrawal from the Red Cross of the responsibility for the 
blood supply of the nation. 
The recommendation was denied -- not as you might think 
because no one could understand the argument, which in con-
text I had the time to explain. The matter hinged entirely on 
the economic consideration. The senior consultants vehe-
mently opposed the plan. They were partners in a famous firm 
of accountants -- and felt that l threatened to destroy the fi-
nancial viability of the Red Cross. The Canadian Secretary-
General seemed torn, but in the end was constrained to sup-
port "prudence". It is by now well known that the blood sup-
ply in Canada eventually turned into a tainted blood scandal, 
and recently led to a Royal Commission. As I give this ad-
dress today (July 1998) there is talk of potential liabilities 
amounting to more than five billion dollars in lawsuits, and of 
seeking bankruptcy protection for the Red Cross. "Prudence"? 
The replacement agency, Canadian Blood Services, starts its 
independent existence on September 1, 1998. There have of 
course been problems in other countries with tainted blood 
supplies, and I do not know how they were organized or what 
led to their difficulties. Long before any of these difficulties in 
Canada surfaced, in fact quite soon after the re-organization, 
which were in other respects successful, the Canadian General 
Secretary went to Geneva to head the International Red Cross. 
The two accountants who had been assisting me at the con-
sulting company resigned to start an independent firm of their 
own. 
Celebration for Candace Pert 
I have never had the honor to meet Dr. Pert. When I asked 
from the hall who had heard of Candace Pert -- the name was 
printed in huge letters on the screen beside the podium -- two 
small knots of a few people in an audience of hundreds raised 
their hands. Then followed a little laughter as each knot was 
observed to center on two well-known professors, each of 
whom is my friend -- and some of their students. Well, we had 
the celebration for Warren McCulloch, and here is another 
celebration -- for Candace Pert. Why? 
Some twenty-five years ago she discovered the opiate recep-
tor. This is a site in the cell that can recognize an opiate, typi-
cally a protein molecule, which is then anchored in the outer 
cell membrane to bind with substances such as neurotransmit-
ters. There was confusion and disagreement at the time, as to 
whether the biochemical components even existed in the body 
naturally to create such outcomes. 
The search to find the opiate receptor was one of dogged en-
durance reminiscent of the search for radium. Other scientists 
were searching too, but it was she who discovered a pair of 
amino acids constituting the critical peptide. This in itself was 
a discovery of major importance -- significant people in the 
field expected Candace Pert to be awarded the Nobel Prize. 
The non- story of that, and of how the hardly less significant 
Lasker Award for medical research (often endorsed by a later 
Nobel Prize) was awarded to three men -- men heavily under-
lined -- will appall but not surprise egalitarian scientists, espe-
cially if they remember the shocking events surrounding 
Rosalind Franklin and the discovery of the DNA molecule. 
You may read about all this in Pert's book Molecules of Emo-
tion (1997), and very entertaining and exciting you will find 
it. 
Informational substances 
However, I do not expect a cybernetic conference to celebrate 
this discovery with particular enthusiasm. Please bear with me 
as I follow the peptide story a little further. All sorts of pep-
tides were shortly discovered, and a whole new era was to 
begin. I suggest that we focus what was to happen on Candace 
Pert's own comments. Where about in the body would you 
expect to find opiate receptors? Obviously you would look in 
the brain itself -- the hypothalamus perhaps. Alternatively you 
would look in the limbic system. But when she looked com-
prehensively for “her” peptides, she found them all over the 
place in the body. Think of finding concentrations of such 
peptides in the colon, as she did... so that's where "gut feel-
ings" come from! ￿’’4
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We move to the early '80s. The neuropeptides, it had reasona-
bly been assumed, communicated across synapses in the 
nervous system. The assumption proved untenable. Many of 
the neuronal receptors were inches away from the neuropep-
tides: how were they communicating, if not across the synap-
tic gap? A co-worker named Miles Herkenham found that, 
counter to the assumption of people working in the neurosci-
ences, less than two percent of neuronal communication actu-
ally occurs at the synapse. This seems so absurd that for sev-
eral years the result was ignored, and put down to errors of 
one sort or another. But Miles Herkenham was right all the 
time. He reckoned that the connection did not reside in the 
synapse-brain cells, but was determined by the specificity of 
the receptors. Candace Pert wrote: "the way in which peptides 
circulate through the body, finding their target receptors in 
regions far more distant than had ever previously been 
thought possible, made the brain communication system re-
semble the endocrine system, whose hormones can travel the 
length and breadth of our bodies. The brain is like a bag of 
hormones!" 
At about this time, Francis Schmitt, who had originated the 
neuroscience research program at MIT, introduced the termi-
nology of "information substances" to describe “a variety of 
transmitters, hormones, factors, and protein ligands.” Ligands 
are various small molecules that specifically bind to a cellular 
receptor, such as the opiate receptor, thereby transmitting an 
informational message to the cell. This was exactly the con-
cept that Candace Pert needed to advance her own work, and 
she embraced it enthusiastically. 
Now there are three classically separated areas of medical 
biology: 
·  Neuroscience -- dealing with the brain and central nerv-
ous system, 
·  Endocrinology -- dealing with the glands, 
·  Immunology -- dealing with the spleen, bone marrow, 
and lymph nodes. 
If you have taken my homily about the hardening of the cate-
gories to heart, and recall my long battle in the '50s to incor-
porate the endocrine system into my brain model, you will 
understand the excitement with which I received the discover-
ies that Molecules of Emotion unfolded. Instead of those three 
sciences demarcated by their library shelves and dedicated 
journals, and following them into separate laboratories, we 
have a unified system. It consists of a multi- directional net-
work of communication, linked by informational carriers at 
the molecular level. It is surely delightful to contemplate the 
continuous molecular busy-ness that achieves wonders of in-
tricate homeostasis -- while quite indifferent to the pompous 
definitions of academe. 
And quo do you think you're vadis? 
May I urge you to read the book? At any rate, I do not have 
the effrontery to dissertate at greater length, thereby spoiling 
the author's own account -- and a thoroughly good read. In-
stead, I return once more to the bridges that I have been trying 
to construct all the way through this address, which began by 
celebrating Warren McCulloch. 
In speaking of him, I referred to rather serious quarrels with 
him about Freud. He contended that the unconscious mind 
was not only illusory, but a delusion -- there was no neuro-
physiological basis for it, and he accused Freud of deliberate 
duplicity. For my part, I had found the notion so useful in the 
practice of clinical psychology that I was happy to accept it as 
a model. Please imagine my squeal of joy to read Candace 
Pert write that the unconscious mind of Freud is no less than 
the body! Perhaps we could both have settled for that. 
Many of the discoveries made by Candace Pert are pointing to 
the kind of holistic emphasis on the unity of being that is fa-
miliar in eastern philosophy. I see her helping to cross that 
East-West divide -- and that other chasm existing between 
science and philosophy. Surely these are matters for high 
celebration. By the end of her book she is openly hypothesiz-
ing about connections not only between body and mind, but 
also between body, mind, soul and spirit. Predictably, she will 
have a rough ride, as do all holists. I should like to wish her 
well in those endeavors, and that she continue with the same 
brave-heartedness with which she confronted so much preju-
dice in the past. Meanwhile, her scientific demonstration of 
the molecular reality of informational substances -- the neu-
ropeptides -- in continual interaction between body and mind 
is, at least in my view, a great cybernetic triumph. 
But hardly anyone in this audience knew of Candace Pert, still 
less of the cybernetic triumph, when I started this talk. How 
can this be? Surely it is because each of us here is pursuing 
the next step in the agenda s/he has elaborated within the con-
fines of the paradigms that are already understood. This 
comment is not meant offensively. The research we are all 
doing, the development of the thinking we so far understand, 
are all worthy pursuits -- the backbone of scientific advance 
indeed. But as system scientists, are we constantly in search 
of systemic invariance? Do we ever consider taking time off 
to play the creative yo-yo? If not, we are tacitly accepting the 
established paradigms of system, tacitly resisting change and 
the hope of new visions. I doubt if anyone present actively 
want to appear in that role. 
That is my reason for linking this second celebration of Can-
dace with the original one for my old mentor and cybernetic 
founding father, Warren. They look well together. What they 
had in common was a holistic sense of system, being 
brighter'n hell, and the fortitude to challenge existing para-￿4#+5’ ￿#/175 ￿’0 n ￿1/’0
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digms and win. I close as I promised with some final words of 
closure about Warren. 
Centenary Valedictory for Warren McCulloch 
Although this is a valedictory for his centenary, it applies to 
this year alone: there will never be a last goodbye -- not for 
me, not anyone who preserves his words. 
The last recorded words I know of were printed by Kathie 
Bateson, I think. They occurred during a session in Austria 
during 1968, in a meeting presided over by her father Gregory 
Bateson. Warren was speaking : 
"The difficulty is that we, who are not single-cell organisms, 
cannot simply divide and pass on our programs. We have to 
couple, and there is behind this a second requirement." Warren 
began to weep. "We learn... that there's a utility in death be-
cause... the world goes on changing and we can't keep up with 
it. If I have any disciples, you can say this of every one of them, 
they think for themselves." 
Very softly Gregory said, "sure, Warren." 
As in many other matters, I have tried to adhere to Warren's 
attitude towards people coming behind. They are surely pre-
cious words of advice.  
I intend to conclude with a piece of poetry written by Warren 
but never (as far as I know) published. First of all, here is a 
Sonnet from me to him. It was written to celebrate his sixty-
fifth birthday in 1963: 
Sonnet for Warren on his sixty-fifth birthday 
 
Days that are cherished, moments that persist, 
reverberate in neural circuits, catch 
in the throat of recollective calm, attach 
to sensory recall. And so enlist: 
the lobsters at Old Lyme; and English mist; 
the snap of seminars; nocturnal scratch 
of pen on paper; your disdain to match 
the paltriness of an antagonist. 
 
The stature and the public awe exist -- 
while secretly the twinkling friendships hatch. 
Warren, the neurons crackling in his head, 
parks fire at nature. Others may insist 
that science is serious. But we shall snatch 
our laughter from the universal dread. 
Stafford Beer (1983b) 
 
And here as promised is what Warren had earlier handwritten 
to me, in the flyleaf of his own poems, The Natural Fit, pub-
lished in 1959: 
Since of that loveliness I know is you 
which in quick having holds me quite content 
love could not gather what could not have grown 
or what from my poor gardening never grew 
 
I to the frenzied and immortal few 
turn hungry home 
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